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Teaching the Ethical Foundations of
Economics
By JONATHAN B. WIGHT
Some economists consider their discipline a science, and thereby
divorced from messy ethical details, the normative passions of
right and wrong. They teach in a moral vacuum, perhaps even
advocating economic agents' operating independently and
avariciously, asserting that this magically produces the greatest
good for society.
Never mind that such a view woefully misinterprets Adam Smith's
"invisible hand"; it also belies economists' own instinctive
experience, even if we do not often preach it, of the role of morals
and virtue in our scholarly endeavors. We abhor plagiarism and
data fabrication, for example, but why? Those practices, after all,
yield short-term gains for an individual scholar. Of course, such
gains are more than offset by scandal when the fraud is uncovered,
and they also leave the university and society poorer. Given what
our disciplinary jargon would label the high transaction costs in
monitoring and finding cheaters, virtuous behavior nurtures the
efficient advancement of knowledge.
Likewise in business, the trustworthy conduct of many professions
improves the efficiency of industries and the economy as a whole.
So when accountants fudge a company's books, and the stock
price balloons, we know that bubble must eventually pop, and that
innocent third parties will bear the brunt of cleanup. Aside from
the unfairness, that situation discourages capital flow to promising
ventures later because of investors' mistrust.
If immoral, or sometimes amoral, behavior has long-term external
costs for business (think of the East Asian capital crises of the late
'90s, or Enron, or Arthur Andersen, or WorldCom), if the role of
virtue in fostering long-run efficiency is important, then why have
economists long disavowed ethics as a legitimate topic for
discussion in the discipline? Beyond the obvious instrumental
benefits, ethics also forms the intrinsic core of a liberal-arts
experience. It is time for moral inquiry to be included as part of
economics education -- or, more accurately, to be reintroduced.
The role of virtue in economics has been extolled since Aristotle.
Adam Smith, in the 18th century, made the analogy of human
society as an "immense machine," and celebrated virtue as the
"fine polish" on its wheels. He excoriated vice as the "rust" that
causes the wheels to "jar and grate upon one another." Ethical
considerations are central to life, Smith said, and "keen and
earnest attention to the propriety of our own conduct ...
constitutes the real essence of virtue."
Indeed, modern economics began as a moral science taught by
professors trained in the analysis of ethical contexts and conflicts.
Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) is both a scientific treatise on
economic development and a forceful statement about the ethics
of markets and the resulting distribution of income. In the 19th
century, however, to disengage the field from the grip of church
theology, positivists sought to gain factual understanding by
eliminating normative considerations. That produced a century-
long near-dominance of positivist analysis.
Yet the normative voice never completely lost its place. The
Association for Social Economics formed in 1941 to advance
economic research into areas of ethics and philosophy. In 1968,
Kenneth Boulding devoted his American Economic Association
presidential address to the theme "Economics as a Moral Science."
From across the philosophical spectrum, the 1974 Nobel Prize
winner Friedrich von Hayek, a critic of the welfare state, wrote
"The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science."
And Amartya Sen, the Nobel winner in 1998, argued in On Ethics
and Economics (1987) that the perceived dichotomy between
positive and normative analysis is false at its heart. Whether we
realize it or not, value judgments pervade positivist analysis. While
not disparaging positivism, Sen argues that considerations of
moral agency present a fruitful line of inquiry for understanding
human motivation and action -- in essence, revitalizing Adam
Smith's more holistic model. Sen concludes, "welfare economics
can be substantially enriched by paying more attention to ethics."
In other words, appealing to the view of economics as a science, he
suggests that ethics doesn't subvert that science, but is rather part
of it.
My own interest in the ethical dimensions of economics arose
while coming of age in Brazil in the 1960s. Those were the
economic "miracle" years. They were presided over by self-
selected military generals under conditions of martial law, and
produced an impressive industrial takeoff. But the surge in wealth
was concentrated at the top through a variety of means including
market manipulation, the repression of organized labor, and the
suppression of dissent through torture and death squads. This
tragedy was replicated throughout much of Latin America and
elsewhere. It brought home to me the essential point that those
who push for "markets" as the answer for social ills -- without any
conception of the required foundations in institutions of justice
and social capital -- will most likely meet with disappointing
results.
Adam Smith was not so naive. Justice is central to his concerns,
and when Smith elaborates in The Wealth of Nations how global
markets can yield greater efficiency, the issue of "justice" arises
about once every seven pages. In an earlier work, The Theory of
Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith depicts justice as a moral concept
of right and wrong that goes beyond legality. To Smith, "Justice ...
is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed,
the great, the immense fabric of human society ... must in a
moment crumble into atoms." Smith accordingly develops a
model by which moral conscience is developed and can be further
enhanced, creating social capital in the form of trust and personal
responsibility. This is the much-neglected ethical framework for
the famous "invisible hand."
By contrast, the American Economic Association lamented the
state of graduate programs producing "too many idiot savants,
skilled in technique but innocent of real economic issues." William
Letwin, in The Origins of Scientific Economics (1963), sums up this
point nicely: "Every economic act, being the action of a human
being, is necessarily also a moral act."
Ethical inquiry is an essential component of my economics
courses, and it doesn't take much class time because it is
integrated into other work. I use a variety of methods, including a
scarcity game, public-policy essays, and novels and movies; some
of my colleagues add service learning. On the first day of Econ 101,
I break the class into groups of four or five students. I ask each
group to spend a minute introducing themselves and to select a
group leader. Then I toss each group a candy bar. I tell them: "You
are stranded on a desert island. One morning, you find a candy bar
on the beach. You have five minutes to determine what to do with
it." After students get over their initial surprise, a spirited
discussion follows. Virtually all groups eventually decide to divide
the candy bar evenly. When I press students on why they chose
that allocation over others, they look at me as if I were from Mars.
They respond as a chorus: "Because it's only fair."
That is a fruitful starting place from which to examine processes of
allocation with which students are already quite familiar -- for
example, egalitarian systems within their nuclear families, dorm-
room selections by lottery, and course registrations filled first-
come/first-served, or by favoritism. It is an easy step to relate
those experiences to the development of socialist economies and
the values such nonmarket systems theoretically serve. We then
progress to discussing the costs of egalitarian systems, such as the
loss of incentives and efficiency, and the possible curtailment of
freedom.
That first class highlights the importance that values play in
deciding distribution. Students can readily understand that social
relations (here, group identity and social harmony) play an
important role in many such decisions. By contrast, teachers who
begin their "Principles of Economics" class by unquestioningly
preaching the standard model of egoistic individualism (Homo
economicus) may either (as empirical studies suggest)
unconsciously alter the values of their students, or irretrievably
alienate some students from the discipline when they experience
dissonance with that one-dimensional portrayal.
Short public-policy essays can also bring ethical values into focus.
For one essay, I have students respond to a newspaper article
about a boy of 3 who is denied surgery by the family's HMO. The
experimental procedure would cost $250,000, but it has only a tiny
probability of saving the boy's life. Without it he will surely die.
Students are asked to put themselves in the shoes of the HMO
director and make their own decision. They are explicitly told that
they must examine the issue of efficiency (defined as saving the
most lives per dollar spent) but that their essay should also discuss
fairness, public health, and other concerns. Their final decision
must entail a clear and careful weighing of their own values under
conditions of scarcity (e.g., all decisions entail lost opportunities).
Students respond to this assignment with great angst. More than
one has been tearfully torn, knowing that denying the operation
would make a quarter-million dollars available for other more
easily treated patients, yet morally unable to deny the boy's
operation. It is important in such critical-thinking exercises that
students understand that their grade is based on the quality of
their analysis of the trade-offs, not their final conclusion. The
exercise plants firmly in students' minds that economics is a
means to understand our choices, not an end in itself. Still, I have
had students over the years confess that they chose the "efficient"
solution simply because they thought that was the "right" answer
in an economics class. Teachers need to be vigilant about creating
such strong unconscious biases. Students must feel free to
examine and advocate sets of choices in which efficiency is not the
only, or even the most important, game in town.
In a second essay, students write about the shortage of human
organs for transplant, caused by a federal law preventing the sale
of organs. Only donated (free) organs are permitted, and these are
allocated based on the severity of a patient's illness rather than
ability to pay. I ask students to determine whether a private market
should be legalized so as to yield more organs. Each human has
two kidneys, and a rise in price could induce the poor (particularly
in developing countries) to part with one of them. Given the
current shortage, the increase in organ supply could potentially
save thousands of lives. Students are again asked to weigh
efficiency concerns against other values such as equity, freedom,
public safety, human dignity, and moral rules. By this point in the
course, students begin to feel comfortable using their economics
training in conjunction with their ethics to reach an answer.
Adam Smith was a devoted fan of the arts as an instrument for
arousing moral understanding. To Smith, "the poets and romance
writers" were "much better instructors" than philosophers. I wrote
a short novel, Saving Adam Smith: A Tale of Wealth,
Transformation, and Virtue, to engage students in such a debate
about the moral foundations of capitalism. The story, about
Smith's tortured soul returning to our world as an immigrant
mechanic in Virginia, brings to life the role of moral agency in
economics. Contrary to popular misperception, Smith studied not
only self-interest but social interests broadly conceived -
- including altruism, loyalty, trust, and, most important, self-
restraint, based on ethical considerations and commitments.
Smith's own writing serves as the basis for much of the dialogue in
my book.
I ask students to read the book, then respond with a short essay in
which they analyze the "greed is good" beliefs of the 18th-century
philosopher Bernard de Mandeville and others, comparing and
contrasting their views with Smith's. Students apply this debate to
the recent corporate financial scandals, and are asked to identify
the role of moral agency in economic efficiency.
In addition to books, films such as The Grapes of Wrath, Wall
Street, Erin Brockovich, and Mr. Smith Goes to Washington are
engaging classics that deal with economic concepts while
questioning "right" and "wrong" behavior.
Some of my colleagues use community-service learning to achieve
the same sort of "grounding" of economics and policy within the
broader ethical context. Students tutor incarcerated juveniles,
assist arriving refugees, work in homeless shelters, and sell
products made by indigenous communities recently opened to
global trade. Initially, these settings often provoke discomfort, and
students' moral "imaginations" (to use Smith's term) become
stretched. Students are asked to read and reflect on the moral
questions associated with the service. The purpose of this
exposure is not to indoctrinate students as to what a correct
ethical response is, but to stimulate their critical thinking and
personal development in ways that enrich their understanding of
economic matters.
These techniques for introducing ethics into the classroom have,
as we economists say, a low opportunity cost in terms of taking
time from existing course work. At an advanced level, a more
intensive examination of ethics and economics would be
desirable, both for reviewing the growing literature about the
impact of ethics on outcomes (e.g., negotiation), as well as for
affirming the inherent function of ethical inquiry in a liberal-arts
education. A few programs (such as Notre Dame's) have offered
such an advanced class, yet for ethics to be widely reintroduced, it
would probably have to be integrated into existing courses.
All business students do it; all law students do it; all medical
students do it. Why shouldn't all budding economists also study
ethics? Many of my colleagues would respond that economists
have a comparative advantage at understanding efficiency, and
are mere amateurs at understanding ethics. Surely it misallocates
resources for economists to devote scarce class time to ethics.
Yet, a hundred years ago, economists were "forced," by virtue of
the changing methodology of the field, to apply the language of
mathematics to their teaching and research. Later they were
"forced" to become proficient at computers and econometrics in
order to carry out quantitative research. I contend that today's
economists are compelled, by world events and the demands of a
liberal-arts education, to rediscover and extend the discipline's
roots. As R.D. Collison Black, the noted historian of economic
thought, so eloquently put it, Adam Smith's economics is a
"system of thought which [places] economic problems firmly in
the context of ethics ... informed throughout by a concept of
justice." How long will it take for economics teachers to realize
that discussions beyond self-interest are in their students' self-
interest?
Jonathan B. Wight is an associate professor of economics at the
University of Richmond. His most recent book is Saving Adam
Smith: A Tale of Wealth, Transformation, and Virtue (Financial
Times/Prentice Hall, 2002).
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